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1  | INTRODUC TION
US health care expenditures represent a substantial portion of pub-
lic spending and are therefore likely to be affected by partisan po-
litical control. At the federal level, for example, the budget for and 
organization of health care were heavily debated by Republicans 
and Democrats during the enactment of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act in 2010 as well as the American Health Care Act of 
2017. The health care budget is debated not only at the federal level 
but also at the state level, which results in considerable variation 
across the United States.1 At the state level, the Medicaid budget 
competes with other state spending priorities, such as education, 
pensions, and welfare. At 27.4% of total state spending, Medicaid 
represents the largest single component of total state expenditures2 
and constitutes a 30.7% share of nursing homes’ (NH) revenues.3
The aim of this study was to improve the understanding of the 
impact of political control on US NHs. We empirically assess how 
political control of the state legislature and of the state governorship 
affects the financial performance, the staff structure, the resident 
composition, and selected resident outcomes at the facility level. The 
findings of this empirical analysis may shed some light on the debate 
on political control and its impact on the real world. The study closes 
the gap between studies exploring the effect of political control on 
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overall health expenditure or social spending and studies examining 
the effect of single regulatory measures on NH outcomes.
1.1 | The role of political control at the 
executive and legislative levels
The effect of political control of the legislature on outcomes has 
been empirically tested by exploiting the variation across US states 
and internationally by exploiting the variation across OECD coun-
tries. Democratic control results in higher budget totals, tax bur-
dens, and welfare spending than Republican control.4-7 Similarly, 
cross- country research reveals that leftist governments increase 
overall social spending,8-10 although two studies document a weak-
ening of this relationship in the 1990s.11,12
Empirical evidence on the role and importance of the governor is 
mixed. Lewis et al13 and Barrilleaux and Berkman14 present evidence 
that governors play a significant role in pursuing redistributive poli-
cies, while Reed7 and Ferguson15 do not find support for this hypoth-
esis. However, considering that the executive officer’s formal power 
is often limited and a veto can be overruled by a legislative superma-
jority in all states, it is likely that the political control wielded by the 
governor affects NHs to a lesser extent than political control of the 
legislative chambers.
1.2 | How political control affects Medicaid’s long- 
term care services
Although Medicaid primarily covers acute care, 25.0% of its budget 
was spent on long- term care in 2014.16 Medicaid’s $118.7 billion 
long- term care budget represents more than one- third of NHs’ 
revenues.17 Unlike Medicare, which is a national health insurance 
program that is solely administered and funded by the federal 
government, Medicaid is a joint federal- state program that is ad-
ministered by the states. The state programs have to conform to 
federal guidelines in order for the state to receive matching funds 
and grants. However, with increasing state discretion over the past 
50 years, state governments are now the most important decision 
makers with regard to eligibility, reimbursement, and the provision 
of care in Medicaid long- term care programs.18
Changes in Medicaid regulations are shaped at the state level 
through the legislative process. In all US states except Nebraska,* 
the legislative procedure resembles the federal process. After a bill 
is introduced, it must pass both legislative chambers, that is, the 
House and the Senate. During this cumbersome process, the bill is 
debated and modified if necessary. Bills can die by failing to gain a 
majority in the subcommittees, through gatekeeping by the chair,19 
or due to filibuster.20 After the debate in the legislature, the bill must 
be signed by the two presiding chairs and, depending on the state, 
by the governor. In some states, the constitution allows for a gu-
bernatorial veto that can be overruled by the two chambers with a 
supermajority.21
Politicians’ political party plays a significant role in defining 
Medicaid eligibility criteria and benefit coverage.22 NHs’ revenues 
can be managed through changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates 
and Medicaid eligibility, and the provision of care is sensitive to the 
reimbursement structure.23 Effort and expenses can be deliberately 
influenced by imposing regulatory requirements, such as minimum 
staffing ratios,24 wage pass- through laws,25 care guidelines, staff 
education regulations,26,27 and documentation requirements.28 In 
addition to directly influencing revenue and expenses, the acting 
government may issue mandates to improve resident outcomes by 
strengthening public reporting,29,30 altering the regulatory process 
or implementing practice guidelines.31
State governments frequently use their power and their instru-
ments to shape the delivery of care. In 2015, 31 states increased 
Medicaid spending, while 13 cut it.2 In 2009, the average state reim-
bursement was $165.33 per resident day.† Between- state variation 
was very high, with South Dakota offering only approximately half 
the rate of New York ($114.03 vs $228.52). In addition to between- 
state variation, reimbursement also varied substantially across time. 
While Oregon (+131.2%) and Arkansas (+122.8%) more than dou-
bled their reimbursements between 1999 and 2009, North Carolina 
(+34.9%) and Illinois (+34.9%) increased reimbursements by only 
approximately one- third over the same 11- year period. Regulatory 
requirements also varied substantially: 29 of the reporting states 
collected a resident bed tax, 37 had a bed- hold policy in place that 
awards a reduced rate for holding a bed while a resident is in the hos-
pital, and 12 states granted wage pass- through payments to increase 
wages and benefits for direct- care staff.
1.3 | Nursing homes’ responses to a changing 
political environment
In order to optimize overall business performance, NH managers 
align their engagement in their main business segments, that is, 
Medicaid, Medicare, and private- pay services, with the political and 
regulatory environment. In case of revenue losses in the Medicaid 
segment, managers stabilize revenues and profit margins by tar-
geting higher- margin Medicare and private- pay residents more in-
tensely32,33 or by restricting access for high- need, high- cost, but 
low- profit residents, for example, dual eligibles.34 Managers may 
also reduce staffing, which represents their largest cost category.
However, reactions may differ between not- for- profit and for- 
profit NHs. Approximately 75% of all facilities in the US market are 
considered to be for- profit NHs,35 and they are assumed to operate 
as profit maximizers36 that can be achieved by preferring private- pay 
and Medicare over Medicaid residents.
Not- for- profit organizations are obliged to serve collective pur-
poses, and they are usually driven by their mission. Nevertheless, 
they have to break even, and therefore, they have to consider profit 
in their objectives in addition to welfare and output maximization.37 
In some cases, not- for- profit organizations face the dilemma of en-
tering commercial fields that may conflict with their social mission to 
overcome financial constraints. In particular in markets where not- 
for- profit and profit- oriented NHs are forced to compete, it is difficult 
to distinguish between not- for- profit and for- profit organizations.38
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1.4 | Conceptual framework
Political control of the House and the Senate enables parties to 
pass laws that shape the Medicaid financed part of the NH industry 
according to their political ideals. Laws on state level (a) may influ-
ence financial performance of NHs, for example, through changes in 
Medicaid reimbursement rates, (b) may affect the resident composi-
tion, for example, by changing the Medicaid eligibility criteria, or (c) 
may have an impact on the outcomes, for example, through public 
reporting. The literature shows that NHs react to regulatory changes 
with changes in their resident mix,39,40 staff structure,41,42 or resi-
dent outcomes.41,43,44 While we can observe the political control of 
the House and the Senate and the effects on NHs, we are often not 
able to observe and disentangle the multitude of different measures 
that are enacted simultaneously by the legislature (see Figure 1).
We hypothesize that the effects on financial performance, struc-
ture, and outcomes differ if one party controls House and Senate 
compared to a divided legislature because the parties do not have 
to compromise. In case of a unified Republican legislature, we ex-
pect that the legislature will pass a bundle that restrict access and 
reimbursement of Medicaid residents and loosen regulatory require-
ments. These measures will then lead to a decrease in NH revenues 
and expenses because of a lower occupancy with Medicaid residents 
and less regulatory burden. We expect that a legislature controlled 
by the Democrats will pass a bundle of laws and regulations that in-
crease Medicaid eligibility, improve reimbursement, and tighten regu-
latory requirements45 leading to increasing revenues and costs, while 
outcomes will improve, and more senior staff will be hired. Finally, 
we hypothesize that for- profit NHs are more likely to be affected by 
political control because the dependency on Medicaid residents is 
higher for for- profit NHs and because not- for- profit NHs are meant 
to pursue a charitable mission. However, if not- for- profit facilities are 
becoming increasingly like for- profit NHs as Weisbrod38 suggests, ef-
fects of political control should not differ between NH types.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Data
Financial facility- level data for the years 1996- 2014 were retrieved 
from the mandatory, annually published Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) cost reports for NHs that are collected 
using the standardized forms CMS- 2540- 96 (until 2010) and CMS- 
2540- 10 (since 2010). The cost report information includes data 
from all Medicare- certified NHs on total resident revenues (Title 
XVIII, Title XIX, and other third- party revenues) and total operat-
ing expenses across all business units as defined in the cost reports. 
Operating profit was defined as the difference between revenues 
and operating expenses. Cost reports with a reporting period of 
90 days or more were considered. As financial year start dates and 
reporting periods vary by NH, we used June 30th as the reference 
date for each calendar year and standardized expenses, revenues, 
and profits to 365 days. All US$ amounts are inflation adjusted and 
represent 2014 US$.46
Nursing homes’ operational and aggregate resident characteris-
tics for the years 1996- 2014 were retrieved from the Online Survey, 
Certification and Reporting data network (OSCAR). Specifically, 
we extracted the aggregate resident acuity index‡; the total num-
ber of beds; the ownership status; the number of current Medicaid, 
Medicare, and private- pay residents; and the staff structure in full- 
time equivalents (FTE), that is, the number of registered nurses 
(RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and certified nursing assis-
tants (CNAs). We also extracted indicators for residents’ health out-
comes, that is, percentage of residents hospitalized, percentage of 
residents on psychoactive drugs, and percentage of residents with 
pressure ulcers.
Data on the majorities in the two legislative chambers and the 
governorship during the legislative sessions from 1995 to 2013 were 
retrieved for all US mainland states with a bicameral legislature,§ 
F IGURE  1 Mechanisms by which political control influences financial performance, resident composition, and outcomes of nursing 
homes
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that is, all states except Nebraska, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District 
of Columbia. For both parties, we coded a binary variable indicating 
a unified legislature in the session year. A legislature was considered 
unified if the same party held more than 50% of the votes in both 
chambers.
We constructed a 19- year panel by merging data from OSCAR 
and the cost reports using the provider identifier and year. State 
election outcomes were merged by state and year. We excluded pub-
lic and hospital- based NHs, as they are likely to have different orga-
nizational and financial structures. Reported revenues or expenses 
per occupied bed- day that belonged to the 1st or the 99th percentile 
of a calendar year were considered inconsistent, and the facility- year 
was truncated. A sensitivity analysis using the 5th and 95th percen-
tile and the yearly thresholds applied are provided in Appendices 
S1 and S2. The panel is unbalanced, as some NHs opened or closed 
during the period of observation.
2.2 | Empirical Model
First, we specified the following empirical model to identify the ef-
fect of Democratic and Republican political control on outcomes: 
where yist represents a time- varying outcome variable at the NH 
level. Depending on the model, the dependent variable represents 
yearly facility revenues, expenses, and profits; the number of 
Medicaid, Medicare, and private- pay residents; the number of RNs, 
LPNs, and CNAs; or resident outcome indicators. The selected 
variables are likely to be sensitive to changes in political control. 
For definitions and rationales, consult Table 1. Xist represents a 
set of time- varying NH characteristics, that is, the total number of 
beds and the acuity index. By controlling for the average residents’ 
acuity at the facility level, we can separate need- based budget 
adjustments from partisan- motivated adjustments. NH is defined 
as a binary variable indicating NH type, that is, for- profit and not- 




 are binary lagged variables represent-
ing the previous year’s unified legislature of the Democratic and 




 are binary lagged 
variables that indicate a trifecta, that is, TD
st−1
 is coded one if a uni-
fied Democratic legislature coincides with a Democratic governor, 
while TR
st−1
 is coded one if a unified Republican legislature coincides 
with a Republican governor. The coefficients γ, δ, , and  are the 
coefficients of primary interest, as they measure the effect of polit-
ical control on outcomes. μs and i control for unobservables at the 
state and facility levels. The year fixed effect t makes the model 
robust against unobserved time- varying trends affecting all NHs, 
such as general technological progress, a shift from NH to home- 
based care, changes in accounting policies, inflation, overall effi-
ciency improvement, or health policy changes at the federal level.
Correlation between the explanatory variables and the residuals 
was handled using mean differencing. Mean differencing allows one 
to exploit within- facility variation and to avoid bias arising from un-
observed and potentially confounding cross- sectional heterogene-
ity, for example, time- invariant environmental factors such as urban 
vs rural settings, deprivation, or other social determinants. We use 
restricted maximum- likelihood estimation with Huber- White cor-
rected standard errors, that is, clustered standard errors on state 
level, to estimate (2). 





, improve the model fit using an F test, as one 
might assume that holding the governorship in addition to both leg-
islative chambers increases the partisan effect. Accounting for a tri-
fecta does not improve the model fit, that is, the parameter estimates 
do not differ, F = 1.40 (P > 0.2475). This finding also does not change 
when excluding the six states without line- item veto power of the 
governor, that is, by excluding Indiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Therefore, we restricted 
the model to the following reduced form for all estimations: 
In all estimations, we accounted for the hierarchical structure 
by nesting NHs within states. Further, we imposed blocks with an 
autoregressive structure in the covariance matrix at the facility 
level to account for correlation due to time- repeated measures 
within the error term.47 All estimations were performed using 
SAS®9.4, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA.
3  | RESULTS
From 1995 to 2013, a total of 346 state- years of a unified 
Democratic legislature and 348 state- years of a unified Republican 
legislature were observed. Only a few states have consistently 
voted for one party over the full 19 years of observation, although 
conventional wisdom might suggest strong political persistence of 
red and blue states (see Appendix S3). A unified Democratic leg-
islature lasted an average of 7.61 years, and a unified Republican 
legislature lasted an average of 6.96 years. After merging and re-
fining the datasets, we obtained a sample of a total of 13 737 NHs 
and 196 320 facility- years (Table 2). Their average size was 115.3 
(SD: 57.7) beds. The average number of beds decreased from 
123.6 (SD: 63.8) in 1996 to 111.6 (SD: 55.0) in 2014, while the 
average acuity index increased from 11.6 (SD: 1.3) to 12.2 (SD: 
1.2) over the same period. Occupancy fell from 89.1% (SD: 10.1) 
in 1996 to 83.5% (SD: 11.8) in 2014. Not- for- profit NHs amount 
to 3815. Resident composition of NHs differs by type. For- profit 
NHs have a higher share of comparatively low paid Medicaid resi-
dents, while not- for- profit NHs serve more private- pay residents. 
However, not- for- profit NHs generate lower profits on average 
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TABLE  1 Definitions and rationales of dependent variables
 Dependent variables Definition Rationale
Financial performance
Revenues Total resident revenue for the entire 
facility
Measures the asset inflow. Revenues are sensitive to changes in the 
Medicaid budget and reimbursement rates
Operating expenses Total operating expenses for the 
entire facility
Measures the asset outflow. Expenses are sensitive to changes in regulatory 
requirements, for example, wage pass- through legislation or documenta-
tion requirements
Operating profit Total resident revenue minus total 
operating expenses
Measures the extent to which asset inflows (revenues) compare with asset 
outflows (expenses). Operating profit is sensitive to changes in expenses 
or changes in revenues
Operating profit 
margin
Operating profit divided by revenues Measured how well a nursing home is being managed. Operating profit 
margin is sensitive to changes in expenses, revenues, and profits
Resident composition
Medicaid (Title XIX) Number of residents who are paid 
for by Medicaid
Medicaid residents belong to the most vulnerable population. 
Reimbursement rates are defined by the states and are usually lower than 
Medicare and private- pay rates. The number of Medicaid residents is 
sensitive to changes in the Medicaid budget, rates, or regulations because 
nursing homes must adapt to a new regulatory environment
Medicare (Title XVIII) Number of residents who are paid 
for by Medicare
Medicare covers post- acute care services for up to 100 days in case of a 
prior hospital stay. Reimbursement rates are defined at the federal level 
and are usually higher than Medicaid but lower than private- pay rates. The 
number of Medicare residents should not be sensitive to changes in the 
state government because the Medicare budget, rates, and regulation are 
administered at the federal level
Private payer Number of residents who are paid 
for privately
Private- pay residents freely negotiate reimbursement. Reimbursement is 
usually higher than regulated Medicaid or Medicare rates. The number of 
private- pay residents may be sensitive to changes in the number of 
Medicaid and Medicare residents, for example, nursing homes may 
substitute private- pay for Medicaid residents
% occupancy Number of residents divided by total 
number of beds
The occupancy rate serves as a proxy for access to long- term care services. 
The occupancy rate may be sensitive to changes in Medicaid eligibility
Staff structure
Registered nurses Number of individuals licensed to 
practice as registered nurses in the 
state where the facility is located 
(full- time equivalents)
Registered nurses are the most skilled professionals, and they work 
independently in many areas. An adequate number and high qualifications 
for the staff are essential for high- quality care, but the staff also repre-
sents the largest cost category in a nursing home. The number of 
registered nurses is sensitive to changes in regulatory requirements, for 
example, minimum staffing ratios or changes in reimbursement
Licensed practical 
nurses
Number of individuals licensed to 
practice as licensed practical nurses 
in the state where the facility is 
located (full- time equivalents)
Licensed practical nurses are usually supervised by registered nurses. An 
adequate number and high qualifications for the staff are essential for 
high- quality care, but the staff also represents the largest cost category in 
a nursing home. The number of licensed practical nurses may be sensitive 
to changes in regulatory requirements, for example, minimum staffing 
ratios or changes in reimbursement
Certified nursing 
assistants
Number of individuals who have 
completed a state- approved 
training and competency evaluation 
program and who are providing 
nursing or nursing- related services 
to residents (full- time equivalents)
Certified nursing assistants are supervised by licensed practical nurses or 
registered nurses. An adequate number and high qualifications for the 
staff are essential for high- quality care, but the staff also represents the 
largest cost category in a nursing home. The number of licensed practical 
nurses may be sensitive to changes in regulatory requirements, for 
example, minimum staffing ratios or changes in reimbursement
Resident outcomes
% of residents on 
psychoactive drugs
Percentage of residents receiving 
any psychoactive drugs
Psychoactive agents may be misused as a convenient way to quiet down 
annoying residents. The percentage of residents on psychoactive drugs is 
sensitive to changes in staff intensity and changes in regulatory 
requirements
(Continues)
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profit gap to their for- profit peers in recent years. Summary statis-
tics are reported in Table 2.
The main results are presented in Table 3. Political control has a sig-
nificant impact on the financial performance of for- profit NHs, whereas 
this is not the case with not- for- profit NHs. For- profit NHs gain sig-
nificantly in revenues by $85 977 (P = 0.0449) every year following 
a unified Democratic legislature compared to a divided legislature. 
Revenues	decrease	by	−$124	940	 (P = 0.0424) after the Republicans 
controlled the legislature. Potential effects on not- for- profit NHs show 
in the same direction, but are not significant at the 5%- level.
We do not observe a significant change in expenses, but we ob-
serve significant effects on operating profits. A unified Republican 
legislator	 leads	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 operating	 profit	 of	 −$94	012	
(P = 0.0265), representing 5.5% of the average NH’s operating profit. 
A unified Democratic legislator leads to an increase in operating profit 
of $73 653 (P = 0.0153), representing 4.3% of the average NH’s op-
erating profit. Operating profit margins are not significantly affected.
Resident payer mix composition is affected by political control. 
Republican political control leads to increase in private- pay residents 
(0.53; P = 0.0096), while Democratic political control leads to a de-
crease	 in	 private-	pay	 residents	 of	 −0.54	 residents	 (P = 0.0472) in 
for- profit NHs. Following Republican political control, the number 
of	Medicaid	financed	residents	decreases	by	−1.06	(P = 0.0002) and 
the number of private- pay residents increases by 0.52 (P = 0.0274) 
in not- for- profit NHs, while the numbers do not change signifi-
cantly after Democratic political control. These numbers are sub-
stantial considering that an average NH accommodates on average 
64.8 Medicaid and 21.6 private- pay residents. As hypothesized, the 
number of Medicare financed residents seems not to be sensitive 
to state level political control because the United States Congress 
decides on Medicare issues on federal level. Staffing levels as well 
as resident outcomes do not change for both NH types after unified 
takeover of the legislature.
4  | DISCUSSION
Analyzing the effect of political control in the three decisive pol-
icy institutions, that is, the two houses of the legislature and the 
governorship, provides important insights into how these political 
institutions shape the provision of long- term care at the facility 
level. According to our results, political control of the two legisla-
tive chambers is more important than holding the governorship. 
Whether Republican or Democrat, both parties start immediately 
implementing their diverging political visions after they obtain the 
majority in both chambers of the legislature with observable results 
in the following year. Their political agendas not only significantly 
differ from each other but also significantly differ from the more 
moderate political decision making that can be observed during a 
divided legislature. However, not all facilities are similarly affected. 
The effect of political control is less intense for not- for- profit NHs 
than for- profit NHs, most likely because they have different missions 
and because of their different resident composition.
The observed changes in resident composition are most likely 
due to restrictions or expansions of Medicaid eligibility. Following a 
Republican controlled legislature, we observe a stronger decrease in 
Medicaid than an increase in private- pay residents. Therefore, access 
to Medicaid NH services seems to be constrained by Republicans 
and not all individuals previously entitled to Medicaid can afford to 
pay their long- term care out- of- pocket. However, access to long- 
term care services may not be necessarily worse because some 
individuals may receive home health care instead. However, to our 
knowledge, evidence as to whether quality of home health care is 
similar to NH care is very limited.
Variables concerning financial performance and resident com-
position seem to be more sensitive to changes in political control 
compared to staff structure and health outcomes. This does not 
necessarily mean that political control does not affect health out-
comes, but it may indicate that the mechanism how regulatory 
measures impact health outcomes is more complex because health 
outcomes also depend on unobserved or contingent factors. This 
makes the causal relationship between regulatory measures 
and health outcomes less obvious which makes it more difficult 
to implement effective measures for political decision makers. 
Similarly, Bowblis, Applebaum48 find in their analysis of increased 
reimbursement for NHs an increase in staffing levels but they 
could not demonstrate effects in non- staffing quality outcomes 
caused by changes in Medicaid reimbursement. Also, Grabowski, 
Stevenson, Caudry, O’Malley, Green, Doherty, and Frank49 could 
find little impact of a value- based purchasing demonstration on 
 Dependent variables Definition Rationale
% of residents with 
pressure ulcers
Percentage of residents with 
pressure ulcers
Pressure ulcers are caused by unrelieved pressure to the skin and are a sign 
of nursing home neglect. The percentage of residents with pressure ulcers 
is sensitive to changes in staff intensity and changes in regulatory 
requirements
Hospitalizations Number of hospitalizations during 
the calendar year for every 365 
resident days
Nursing home residents are transferred to hospitals if they have an acute 
change in their condition. Hospitalizations can usually be avoided by timely 
care from staff members who know their residents’ needs. The number of 
hospitalizations therefore indicates the general quality of care. The 
number of hospitalizations is sensitive to changes in staff intensity and 
changes in regulatory requirements
TABLE  1  (Continued)
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NHs’ quality outcomes. Therefore, the non- significant findings in 
health outcomes should be considered with care. Staff levels are 
likely not affected because there is a general shortage in nurses 
on all levels. Therefore, NHs will not reduce staff levels with a 
decreasing occupancy and they have difficulties to increase staff 
levels despite increasing residents.
With our study on political control, we complement studies 
that analyze the effect of distinct policy initiatives, such as the 
effect of minimum staffing standards,50,51 certificate- of- need 
regulations,52,53 and reimbursement changes.41,43,54 In compar-
ison with those studies, we analyze the full range of Republican 
and Democratic possibilities for policy making and how these af-
fect the NH industry. Although we cannot attribute the effects 
to specific policy interventions, this approach is not necessarily a 
disadvantage. We provide a more holistic and balanced overview 
of the effect of political control, and our empirical model specifi-
cation is less affected by unobserved confounding. Confounding 
is often a major limitation in policy intervention analyses be-
cause most interventions differ in design, and they are often 
implemented simultaneously through a whole array of policy 
measures.
4.1 | Unified Republican legislature
We observe a significant reduction in Medicaid residents and a 
significant increase in private- pay residents following a unified 
Republican legislature. This shift in resident composition is more 
likely to be a result of restrictive Medicaid policies than it is a delib-
erate decision of a NH to focus on the more lucrative private- pay 
segment. If it would be a deliberate decision of the NH to substitute 
residents, one would expect that the effect on not- for- profit NHs 
would be smaller than on for- profit NHs. The strive for profit maxi-
mization may incentivize for- profit NHs to more strongly prefer 
the private- pay segment in which eligibility, reimbursement rates, 
and service levels are more freely negotiable compared to not- for- 
profit NHs that at least partly follow a charitable mission. In addi-
tion, choices of NHs are often restricted. Most NHs operate at low 
capacity which is at 86.1% on average. At these levels, NHs cannot 
choose between admitting an unattractive Medicaid or a private- 
pay resident. They rather choose between a Medicaid resident or 
an empty bed.
We do not observe a significant effect of Republican political 
control on NHs’ expenses. Here, it is likely that two opposing effects 
occur that are under the control of the facilities. NHs may reduce 
service levels for Medicaid and invest in more demanding private- 
pay residents to address the new environment. One may also argue 
that state mandates are put in place that prevent NHs from reducing 
service levels for Medicaid beneficiaries or that it is more difficult for 
NHs to enforce cost reductions than to increase expenses. However, 
the increase in the private- pay segment does not fully offset the 
loss in the important Medicaid segment because profits—the resid-
ual of revenues and expenses—seem to be negatively affected by 
Republican political control.
4.2 | Unified Democratic legislature
Revenues of for- profit NHs increase the year following a Democratic 
domination of the legislature while revenues of not- for- profit NHs 
do not change significantly. This results in a significant increase in 
profits of $73 653. The observed increase in revenues therefore 
raises the question of whether the additional resources are tied to 
further regulatory requirements. Such requirements may ask NHs 
to serve more Medicaid beneficiaries, obey minimum- staffing ratios, 
increase wages of direct- care staff, extend bed- hold policies, or pay 
higher bed taxes. However, according to our data, we do not observe 
significant changes in the number of Medicaid residents, the number 
of staff, or in the facilities’ expenses. This indicates that the potential 
regulatory requirements are presumably not expensive, not effec-
tive, or not existent and in turn lead to observable increases in prof-
its for the for- profit NHs.
One might also argue that boosting NHs’ financial performance55 
or providing higher reimbursement54,56 leads to better resident out-
comes. However, according to our results, political control is not sig-
nificantly related to resident outcomes. This finding is surprising, as 
a large number of hospitalizations are considered to be inappropriate 
or avoidable,57 and the number of hospitalizations seems to be sen-
sitive to changes in reimbursement policies.58 However, Medicare 
pays for hospitalization, while Medicaid is neutral or even leads to 
savings when a resident is hospitalized.
4.3 | For- profit vs not- for- profit nursing homes
According to our data, not- for- profit NHs are less sensitive to po-
litical control than are for- profit NHs. The share of private- pay 
residents in not- for- profit NHs is 29.4%, about 50% higher than in 
for- profit NHs (19.5%). The higher share of state- regulated Medicaid 
residents renders for- profit NHs more exposed to political control, 
while the higher share of high- margin non- regulated private- pay 
residents provides not- for- profit NHs with more financial flexibility. 
This financial flexibility allows NHs to achieve charitable goals and 
to break even simultaneously. Interestingly, since for- profit and not- 
for- profit NHs are affected differently by political control, it may be 
the case that not- for- profit NHs are not becoming like private firms 
as Weisbrod38 suggests.
4.4 | Gubernatorial power
In the sphere of NH care and Medicaid payment policies, political 
control matters at the legislative level but—according to our results—
not at the gubernatorial level. Fundamentally, our finding is consist-
ent with the median voter theorem.59 Similar to Reed7 and Leigh,60 
we argue that governors have to behave in a more centrist manner 
than the legislature because they have to appeal to the median voter 
of the whole state, while members of the legislature have to appeal 
to the median voters in their districts. Being more centrist than the 
legislature, the governor does not foster or inhibit the ambitions of 
the legislature in implementing partisan long- term care policies.
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TABLE  3 Parameter estimates of unified Republican and Democratic legislatures and interaction effects with for- profit and  
not- for- profit nursing homes
For- profit nursing homes For- profit nursing homes*unified Republican legislator For- profit nursing homes*unified Democratic legislator
Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI
Financial performance
Revenues $60 558*** $17 125 0.0004 $26 993 $94 123 −$124	940* $61 566 0.0424 −$245	609	 −$4	272	 $85 977* $42 878 0.0449 $1 938 $170 016 
Operating expenses −$3	602	 $16 047 0.8224 −$35	055	 $27 851 −$56	343 $43 224 0.1924 −$141	062	 $28 375 $30 788 $34 577 0.3733 −$36	983	 $98 558 
Operating profit $52 941 *** $11 526 <0.0001 $30 351 $75 530 −$94	012	* $42 359 0.0265 −$177	034	 −$10	991	 $73 653* $30 355 0.0153 $14 157 $133 148 
Operating profit margin 0.004*** 0.001 <0.0001 0.003 0.006 −0.004	 0.004 0.3063 −0.012	 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.2862 −0.003	 0.010 
Resident composition
Medicaid (Title XIX) −0.11	 0.11 0.3144 −0.32	 0.10 −0.62† 0.35 0.0712 −1.30	 0.05 0.58 0.36 0.1137 −0.14	 1.29 
Medicare (Title XVIII) 0.13 ** 0.04 0.0044 0.04 0.21 −0.16	 0.23 0.4857 −0.62	 0.30 0.31 0.20 0.1274 −0.09	 0.71 
Private Payer −0.09	 0.07 0.2089 −0.23	 0.05 0.53 ** 0.21 0.0096 0.13 0.94 −0.54* 0.27 0.0472 −1.07	 −0.01	
% occupancy −0.08	 0.07 0.2156 −0.21	 0.05 −0.18	 0.21 0.4025 −0.60	 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.5059 −0.34	 0.70 
Staff structure
Registered nurses −0.01	 0.03 0.7181 −0.07	 0.05 −0.09	 0.09 0.3117 −0.28	 0.09 −0.10	 0.16 0.5244 −0.40	 0.21 
Licensed practical nurses 0.04 0.03 0.2082 −0.02	 0.11 −0.05	 0.15 0.7442 −0.35	 0.25 0.20† 0.11 0.0738 −0.02	 0.43 
Certified nursing assistants −0.20† 0.11 0.0644 −0.42	 0.01 0.03 0.45 0.9487 −0.85	 0.91 0.08 0.33 0.8093 −0.56	 0.72 
Resident outcomes
% of residents on psychoactive drugs 0.10† 0.06 0.0794 −0.01	 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.4136 −0.34	 0.82 −0.05	 0.32 0.8771 −0.67	 0.57 
% of residents with pressure ulcers 0.01 0.01 0.5521 −0.02	 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.8820 −0.18	 0.21 −0.14	 0.10 0.1418 −0.33	 0.05 
Hospitalizations 0.00 0.00 0.1305 −0.00	 0.01 −0.01	 0.02 0.3854 −0.04	 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.5538 −0.02	 0.03 
Not- for- profit nursing homes Not- for- profit nursing homes*unified Republican legislator Not- for- profit nursing homes*unified Democratic legislator
Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI
Financial performance
Revenues Reference – – – – −$41	166 $48 222 0.3933 −$135	680 $53 348 $150 154 $129 078 0.2447 −$102	835 $403 143
Operating expenses Reference – – – – −$8461 $41 383 0.8380 −$89	570 $72 649 $79 552 $82 349 0.3340 −$81	850 $240 954
Operating profit Reference – – – – −$68	050† $41 216 0.0987 −$148	831 $12 732 $71 261 $55 488 0.1990 −$37	494 $180 017
Operating profit margin Reference – – – – −0.005 0.004 0.2004 −0.012 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.3211 −0.004 0.012
Resident composition
Medicaid (Title XIX) Reference – – – – −1.06*** 0.29 0.0002 −1.62 −0.50 −0.10 0.42 0.8070 −0.93 0.72
Medicare (Title XVIII) Reference – – – – 0.11 0.17 0.5076 −0.22 0.44 0.20 0.35 0.5608 −0.48 0.88
Private Payer Reference – – – – 0.52* 0.24 0.0274 0.06 0.98 −0.33 0.56 0.5609 −1.43 0.78
% occupancy Reference – – – – −0.33† 0.17 0.0559 −0.68 0.01 −0.31 0.25 0.2094 −0.80 0.18
Staff structure
Registered nurses Reference – – – – −0.11 0.11 0.3086 −0.32 0.10 −0.13 0.24 0.5783 −0.59 0.33
Licensed practical nurses Reference – – – – −0.11 0.13 0.3741 −0.36 0.14 −0.05 0.15 0.7311 −0.35 0.25
Certified nursing assistants Reference – – – – −0.05 0.37 0.8926 −0.78 0.68 −0.33 0.40 0.4054 −1.12 0.45
Resident outcomes
% of residents on psychoactive drugs Reference – – – – −0.31 0.29 0.2824 −0.89 0.26 −0.13 0.31 0.6646 −0.74 0.47
% of residents with pressure ulcers Reference – – – – 0.11 0.09 0.2175 −0.06 0.28 0.19† 0.10 0.0549 −0.00 0.38
Hospitalizations Reference – – – – 0.00 0.01 0.8406 −0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.7664 −0.02 0.02
Notes: Controlled for year, residents’ acuity, and total number of beds in all models; Huber- White corrected (robust) standard errors.
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05; †P < 0.1.
CI, confidence intervals; SD, standard error.
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TABLE  3 Parameter estimates of unified Republican and Democratic legislatures and interaction effects with for- profit and  
not- for- profit nursing homes
For- profit nursing homes For- profit nursing homes*unified Republican legislator For- profit nursing homes*unified Democratic legislator
Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI
Financial performance
Revenues $60 558*** $17 125 0.0004 $26 993 $94 123 −$124	940* $61 566 0.0424 −$245	609	 −$4	272	 $85 977* $42 878 0.0449 $1 938 $170 016 
Operating expenses −$3	602	 $16 047 0.8224 −$35	055	 $27 851 −$56	343 $43 224 0.1924 −$141	062	 $28 375 $30 788 $34 577 0.3733 −$36	983	 $98 558 
Operating profit $52 941 *** $11 526 <0.0001 $30 351 $75 530 −$94	012	* $42 359 0.0265 −$177	034	 −$10	991	 $73 653* $30 355 0.0153 $14 157 $133 148 
Operating profit margin 0.004*** 0.001 <0.0001 0.003 0.006 −0.004	 0.004 0.3063 −0.012	 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.2862 −0.003	 0.010 
Resident composition
Medicaid (Title XIX) −0.11	 0.11 0.3144 −0.32	 0.10 −0.62† 0.35 0.0712 −1.30	 0.05 0.58 0.36 0.1137 −0.14	 1.29 
Medicare (Title XVIII) 0.13 ** 0.04 0.0044 0.04 0.21 −0.16	 0.23 0.4857 −0.62	 0.30 0.31 0.20 0.1274 −0.09	 0.71 
Private Payer −0.09	 0.07 0.2089 −0.23	 0.05 0.53 ** 0.21 0.0096 0.13 0.94 −0.54* 0.27 0.0472 −1.07	 −0.01	
% occupancy −0.08	 0.07 0.2156 −0.21	 0.05 −0.18	 0.21 0.4025 −0.60	 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.5059 −0.34	 0.70 
Staff structure
Registered nurses −0.01	 0.03 0.7181 −0.07	 0.05 −0.09	 0.09 0.3117 −0.28	 0.09 −0.10	 0.16 0.5244 −0.40	 0.21 
Licensed practical nurses 0.04 0.03 0.2082 −0.02	 0.11 −0.05	 0.15 0.7442 −0.35	 0.25 0.20† 0.11 0.0738 −0.02	 0.43 
Certified nursing assistants −0.20† 0.11 0.0644 −0.42	 0.01 0.03 0.45 0.9487 −0.85	 0.91 0.08 0.33 0.8093 −0.56	 0.72 
Resident outcomes
% of residents on psychoactive drugs 0.10† 0.06 0.0794 −0.01	 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.4136 −0.34	 0.82 −0.05	 0.32 0.8771 −0.67	 0.57 
% of residents with pressure ulcers 0.01 0.01 0.5521 −0.02	 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.8820 −0.18	 0.21 −0.14	 0.10 0.1418 −0.33	 0.05 
Hospitalizations 0.00 0.00 0.1305 −0.00	 0.01 −0.01	 0.02 0.3854 −0.04	 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.5538 −0.02	 0.03 
Not- for- profit nursing homes Not- for- profit nursing homes*unified Republican legislator Not- for- profit nursing homes*unified Democratic legislator
Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI Estimate SD P- value Lower CI Upper CI
Financial performance
Revenues Reference – – – – −$41	166 $48 222 0.3933 −$135	680 $53 348 $150 154 $129 078 0.2447 −$102	835 $403 143
Operating expenses Reference – – – – −$8461 $41 383 0.8380 −$89	570 $72 649 $79 552 $82 349 0.3340 −$81	850 $240 954
Operating profit Reference – – – – −$68	050† $41 216 0.0987 −$148	831 $12 732 $71 261 $55 488 0.1990 −$37	494 $180 017
Operating profit margin Reference – – – – −0.005 0.004 0.2004 −0.012 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.3211 −0.004 0.012
Resident composition
Medicaid (Title XIX) Reference – – – – −1.06*** 0.29 0.0002 −1.62 −0.50 −0.10 0.42 0.8070 −0.93 0.72
Medicare (Title XVIII) Reference – – – – 0.11 0.17 0.5076 −0.22 0.44 0.20 0.35 0.5608 −0.48 0.88
Private Payer Reference – – – – 0.52* 0.24 0.0274 0.06 0.98 −0.33 0.56 0.5609 −1.43 0.78
% occupancy Reference – – – – −0.33† 0.17 0.0559 −0.68 0.01 −0.31 0.25 0.2094 −0.80 0.18
Staff structure
Registered nurses Reference – – – – −0.11 0.11 0.3086 −0.32 0.10 −0.13 0.24 0.5783 −0.59 0.33
Licensed practical nurses Reference – – – – −0.11 0.13 0.3741 −0.36 0.14 −0.05 0.15 0.7311 −0.35 0.25
Certified nursing assistants Reference – – – – −0.05 0.37 0.8926 −0.78 0.68 −0.33 0.40 0.4054 −1.12 0.45
Resident outcomes
% of residents on psychoactive drugs Reference – – – – −0.31 0.29 0.2824 −0.89 0.26 −0.13 0.31 0.6646 −0.74 0.47
% of residents with pressure ulcers Reference – – – – 0.11 0.09 0.2175 −0.06 0.28 0.19† 0.10 0.0549 −0.00 0.38
Hospitalizations Reference – – – – 0.00 0.01 0.8406 −0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.7664 −0.02 0.02
Notes: Controlled for year, residents’ acuity, and total number of beds in all models; Huber- White corrected (robust) standard errors.
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05; †P < 0.1.
CI, confidence intervals; SD, standard error.
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4.5 | Limitations and further research
Our study has several limitations arising from our need for a long 
data series and the observational nature of our question and ana-
lytic approach. First, our measures of quality are related to staff-
ing and aggregated indicators reported in NH OSCAR reports as 
opposed to the more modern patient level measures derived from 
Medicare claims like hospitalizations and MDS- based measures 
like Activities of Daily Living. While widely used and considered 
as a valid outcome and process indicators in the NH literature,61 
hospitalizations are influenced by payer status,62 psychoactive 
drug use varies with facility practice styles, and pressure ulcers 
may have been present before NH admission. Despite those short-
comings, we are not aware of more suitable quality measures that 
are measured consistently across 19 years and are available for all 
NHs in all states. In the future when a long enough data series 
with newer outcomes become available, our research should be 
replicated.
While an observational study, we took several measures to 
address confounding. Mean differencing makes the model robust 
against factors such as facility size, effects from chain affiliation, 
competition, general surrounding economic conditions, and depri-
vation in the area. In addition, the model includes year dummies that 
capture factors that change nationally, for example, the election of 
a new president. However, with this model specification, we might 
have missed time- varying factors that change at the state level, such 
as above- average economic growth or general economic conditions. 
Although we believe that we have controlled for most of the con-
founding factors, an unobserved variable bias may persist. Further 
research may attempt to control for those time- varying confounding 
factors using a longer panel or different methods.
Finally, our conceptual model measures the effect of political 
control of the legislature on NH financial performance, structure, 
and outcomes. However, the different laws and regulations ulti-
mately causing the changes in the dependent variables are consid-
ered a black box. Further research may consider a mediation model 
where political control influences laws and regulations, especially 
reimbursement, and laws and regulations passed affect NH financial 
performance, structure, and outcomes.
5  | CONCLUSION
Our findings expand upon the literature analyzing the impact of 
political control on state policy decisions. By adding to the existing 
literature analyzing the impact of political control at the aggregate 
level, such as the state Medicaid budget or tax dollars, we provide 
insights into the way that political control affects the single facili-
ties that provide the services. Based on our analysis, we can con-
clude that political control of the two legislative chambers—but 
not of the governorship—not only impacts aggregate budgets but 
also effectively shapes the provision of long- term care services in 
the field.
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ENDNOTE S
* Nebraska has a unicameral system, while all other states have bicameral 
systems with two chambers. 
† According to a survey of all Medicaid offices conducted at Brown 
University in 2010. 
‡ The acuity index is a facility- level aggregate measure defined by the 
LTC- focus research group at Brown University that is calculated based 
on the daily living assistance dependencies and other special treat-
ment needs for all residents (see www.ltcfocus.org). 
§ Data on election results were compiled manually based on informa-
tion mainly provided by www.ballotpedia.org and www.wikipedia.
org. Data obtained was crosschecked with official state website data 
where available. Data collection was performed in March 2016. 
ORCID
Carl Rudolf Blankart  http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6719-0038 
Andrew D. Foster  http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0406-7558 
Vincent Mor  http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0084-1267     
R E FE R E N C E S
 1. Miller EA. State discretion and Medicaid program variation in 
long- term care: when is enough, enough? J Aging Soc Policy. 
2002;14(3–4):15-35.
 2. Officers NAOSB. The Fiscal Survey of States. Washington, DC: 
National Association of State Budget Officers; 2015.
 3. Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities; 
Aggregate and per Capita Amounts, Percent Distribution and 
Annual Percent Change by Source of Funds: Calendar Years 2010-
2026. 2016. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Downloads/Proj2017Tables.zip. Accessed February 14, 2018.
 4. Alt JE, Lowry RC. Divided government, fiscal institutions, and 
budget deficits: evidence from the States. Am Polit Sci Rev. 
1994;88(4):811-828.
 5. Besley T, Case A. Does electoral accountability affect economic 
policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Q J Econ. 
1995;110(3):769-798.
 6. Alt JE, Lowry RC. A dynamic model of state budget outcomes under 
divided partisan government. J Polit. 2000;62(4):1035-1069.
 7. Reed WR. Democrats, republicans, and taxes: evidence that politi-
cal parties matter. J Public Econ. 2006;90(4–5):725-750.
 8. Cusack TR. Partisan politics and public finance: changes in pub-
lic spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989. Public 
Choice. 1997;91(3):375-395.
     |  179Health Services ResearchBLANKART eT AL.
 9. Blais A, Blake D, Dion S. Do parties make a difference? Parties 
and the size of government in liberal democracies. Am J Polit Sci. 
1993;37(1):40-62.
 10. Blais A, Blake D, Dion S. Do parties make a difference? A reap-
praisal. Am J Polit Sci. 1996;40(2):514-520.
 11. Kittel B, Obinger H. Political parties, institutions, and the dynam-
ics of social expenditure in times of austerity. J Eur Public Policy. 
2003;10(1):20-45.
 12. Potrafke N. Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empiri-
cal evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. 
Public Choice. 2009;140(1):105-124.
 13. Lewis DC, Schneider SK, Jacoby WG. Institutional characteristics 
and state policy priorities: the impact of legislatures and governors. 
State Polit Policy Quart. 2015;15(4):447-475.
 14. Barrilleaux C, Berkman M. Do governors matter? Budgeting rules and 
the politics of state policymaking. Polit Res Quart. 2003;56(4):409-417.
 15. Ferguson MR. Chief executive success in the legislative arena. State 
Polit Policy Quart. 2003;3(2):158-182.
 16. Kaiser Family Foundation. Distribution of medicaid spending 
by service. In. State Health Facts. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family 
Foundation; 2014.
 17. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The National Health 
Expenditure Accounts (NHEA). 2014.
 18. Thompson FJ, Cantor JC, Farnham J. Medicaid long- term care: state 
variation and the intergovernmental lobby. J Health Polit Policy Law. 
2016;41:763-780.
 19. Denzau AT, Mackay RJ. Gatekeeping and monopoly power of com-
mittees: an analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior. Am J Polit 
Sci. 1983;27(4):740-761.
 20. Fisk C, Chemerinsky E. The filibuster. Stanford Law Rev. 
1997;49(2):181-254.
 21. Kollmann K. The American Political System. New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc; 2012.
 22. Grogan CM. Political- economic factors influencing state medicaid 
policy. Polit Res Quart. 1994;47(3):589-622.
 23. McKnight R. Home care reimbursement, long- term care utilization, 
and health outcomes. J Public Econ. 2006;90(1–2):293-323.
 24. Zhang NJ, Unruh L, Liu R, Wan TT. Minimum nurse staffing ratios 
for nursing homes. Nurs Econ. 2006;24(2):78-85, 93, 55.
 25. Foster AD, Lee YS. Staffing subsidies and the quality of care in nurs-
ing homes. J Health Econ. 2015;41:133-147.
 26. Kuske B, Luck T, Hanns S, et al. Training in dementia care: a cluster- 
randomized controlled trial of a training program for nursing home 
staff in Germany. Int Psychogeriatr. 2009;21(2):295-308.
 27. Kuske B, Hanns S, Luck T, Angermeyer MC, Behrens J, Riedel-
Heller SG. Nursing home staff training in dementia care: a 
systematic review of evaluated programs. Int Psychogeriatr. 
2007;19(5):818-841.
 28. Hawes C, Mor V, Phillips CD, et al. The OBRA- 87 nursing 
home regulations and implementation of the resident assess-
ment instrument: effects on process quality. J Am Geriatr Soc. 
1997;45(8):977-985.
 29. Stevenson DG. Is a public reporting approach appropriate for nurs-
ing home care? J Health Polit Policy Law. 2006;31(4):773-810.
 30. Werner RM, Konetzka RT, Kruse GB. Impact of public reporting on 
unreported quality of care. Health Serv Res. 2009;44(2p1):379-398.
 31. Wiener JM. An assessment of strategies for improving quality of 
care in nursing homes. Gerontologist. 2003;43(suppl 2):19-27.
 32. Grabowski DC. Medicare and medicaid: conflicting incentives for 
long- term care. Milbank Q. 2007;85(4):579-610.
 33. Harrington C, Hauser C, Olney B, Rosenau PV. Ownership, fi-
nancing, and management strategies of the ten largest for- 
profit nursing home chains in the United States. Int J Health Serv. 
2011;41(4):725-746.
 34. Mitchell JB, Haber SG. State payment limitations on medicare 
cost- sharing: impact on dually eligible beneficiaries. INQUIRY 
2004;41(4):391-400.
 35. Harris-Kojetin L, Sengupta M, Park-Lee E, et al. Long- term care provid-
ers and services users in the United States: data from the national study 
of long- term care providers, 2013- 2014. Vital Health Stat 2016;38:1-118.
 36. Weech-Maldonado R, Laberge A, Pradhan R, Johnson CE, Yang Z, 
Hyer K. Nursing home financial performance: the role of ownership 
and chain affiliation. Health Care Managent Rev. 2012;37(3):235-245.
 37. Deneffe D, Masson RT. What do not- for- profit hospitals maximize? 
Int J Ind Organ. 2002;20(4):461-492.
 38. Weisbrod BA. To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation 
of the Nonprofit Sector. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press; 1998.
 39. Feng Z, Grabowski DC, Intrator O, Mor V. The effect of state medic-
aid case- mix payment on nursing home resident acuity. Health Serv 
Res. 2006;41(4 Pt 1):1317-1336.
 40. Rahman M, Gozalo P, Tyler D, Grabowski DC, Trivedi A, Mor 
V. Dual eligibility, selection of skilled nursing facility, and 
length of medicare paid postacute stay. Med Care Res Rev. 
2014;71:384-401.
 41. Konetzka RT, Yi D, Norton EC, Kilpatrick KE. Effects of medicare 
payment changes on nursing home staffing and deficiencies. Health 
Serv Res. 2004;39(3):463-488.
 42. Feng Z, Lee YS, Kuo S, Intrator O, Foster A, Mor V. Do medicaid 
wage pass- through payments increase nursing home staffing? 
Health Serv Res. 2010;45(3):728-747.
 43. Grabowski DC. Does an increase in the medicaid reimbursement 
rate improve nursing home quality? J Gerontol Series B: Psychol Sci 
Soc Sci. 2001;56(2):S84-S93.
 44. Lin H. Revisiting the relationship between nurse staffing and qual-
ity of care in nursing homes: an instrumental variables approach. J 
Health Econ. 2014;37:13-24.
 45. Miller EA. State health policy making determinants, theory, and 
methods: a synthesis. Soc Sci Med. 2005;61(12):2639-2657.
 46. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consumer Price Index (CPI). 2018.
 47. Kincaid C. Guidelines for selecting the covariance structure in 
mixed model analysis. Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual SAS 
Users Group International Conference. 2005(198-30).
 48. Bowblis JR, Applebaum R. How does medicaid reimbursement 
impact nursing home quality? The effects of small anticipatory 
changes. Health Serv Res. 2017;52(5):1729-1748.
 49. Grabowski DC, Stevenson DG, Caudry DJ, et al. The impact of nurs-
ing home pay- for- performance on quality and medicare spending: 
results from the nursing home value- based purchasing demonstra-
tion. Health Serv Res. 2017;52(4):1387-1408.
 50. Matsudaira JD. Government regulation and the quality of health-
care: evidence from minimum staffing legislation for nursing homes. 
J Hum Resour. 2014;49(1):32-72.
 51. Bowblis JR, Hyer K. Nursing home staffing requirements and input 
substitution: effects on housekeeping, food service, and activities 
staff. Health Serv Res. 2013;48(4):1539-1550.
 52. Grabowski DC, Ohsfeldt RL, Morrisey MA. The effects of CON re-
peal on medicaid nursing home and long- term care expenditures. 
INQUIRY 2003;40(2):146-157.
 53. Harrington C, Swan JH, Nyman JA, Carrillo H. The effect of certifi-
cate of need and moratoria policy on change in nursing home beds 
in the United States. Med Care. 1997;35(6):574-588.
 54. Mor V, Gruneir A, Feng Z, Grabowski DC, Intrator O, Zinn J. The 
effect of state policies on nursing home resident outcomes. J Am 
Geriatr Soc. 2011;59(1):3-9.
 55. Park J, Werner RM. Changes in the relationship between nursing 
home financial performance and quality of care under public re-
porting. Health Econ. 2011;20(7):783-801.
180  |     Health Services Research BLANKART eT AL.
 56. Cohen JW, Spector WD. The effect of Medicaid reimbursement 
on quality of care in nursing homes. J Health Econ. 1996;15(1): 
23-48.
 57. Ouslander JG, Lamb G, Perloe M, et al. Potentially avoidable hospi-
talizations of nursing home residents: frequency, causes, and costs. 
J Am Geriatr Soc. 2010;58(4):627-635.
 58. Mor V, Intrator O, Feng Z, Grabowski DC. The revolving door of rehos-
pitalization from skilled nursing facilities. Health Aff. 2010;29(1):57-64.
 59. Downs A. An economic theory of political action in a democracy. J 
Political Econ. 1957;65:135-150.
 60. Leigh A. Estimating the impact of gubernatorial partisanship on 
policy settings and economic outcomes: a regression discontinuity 
approach. Eur J Polit Econ. 2008;24(1):256-268.
 61. Spilsbury K, Hewitt C, Stirk L, Bowman C. The relationship between 
nurse staffing and quality of care in nursing homes: a systematic 
review. Int J Nurs Stud. 2011;48(6):732-750.
 62. Cai S, Mukamel DB, Veazie P, Katz P, Temkin-Greener 
H. Hospitalizations in nursing homes: does payer source 
matter? Evidence from New York state. Med Care Res Rev. 
2011;68(5):559-578.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the 
Supporting Information section at the end of the article. 
How to cite this article: Blankart CR, Foster AD, Mor V. The 
effect of political control on financial performance, structure, 
and outcomes of US nursing homes. Health Serv Res. 
2019;54:167–180. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13061
